PR vs. SNTV – Election Systems in Developing Democracies

Commented by Tim Meisburger

The Asia Foundation

Recently several expatriate advisors have suggested that list proportional representation (PR) would be a more appropriate election system for Afghanistan than the current single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system favored by the President. Although proportional representation has advantages in certain situations, experience has shown that it may not be the most appropriate system for a developing democracy.

In the list proportional system countries are divided into a few large multi-member constituencies (in Afghanistan these would most likely be provinces, as is the case in Cambodia), or the entire country may be a single constituency (as in
South Africa). Parties, rather than individual candidates, compete in each multi-member constituency [1], then seats are awarded based on the percentage of the vote each party receives. For example, in a constituency entitled to ten seats in
the National Assembly each party would put forward a list of ten candidates: then, if the party won thirty percent of the vote in the constituency, they would win thirty percent (3) of the seats and the top three names on their list would be elected. A party that got twenty percent of the vote would elect the top two people on its list, and so on.

Proportional representation is viewed by many experts as a particularly appropriate election system for newly democratizing countries for several reasons. It is a relatively simple system to explain to the public (although not as simple as SNTV or other plurality systems), facilitating voter education. It is also very simple to administer. Rather than many different ballots with the names of many different candidates, they need only prepare a single ballot that lists
the parties competing. PR also often uses existing administrative boundaries to define the constituency, meaning administrators need not go through the time-consuming and politically sensitive district delimitation process.

But the most important factor, usually, in the selection of PR as an election system is the perception that it is an effective tool for facilitating peaceful transitions and stable political outcomes in post-conflict countries. Typically in a post-conflict democratizing country the competing factions (warlord, militias, armies) will morph into political parties. Using proportional representation as an incentive, negotiators can then offer each faction or party a share of power in the new government proportional to the area or population they control. This works quite well for the faction leaders, who more or less share the spoils, but it may not be the most appropriate system to encourage sustainable and representative
self-government.

In plurality election systems, like first-past-the-post or SNTV, those elected represent all of the people in a geographic area. In a proportional system, because people vote for a party and its manifesto rather than an individual, they represent only those people who share their ideology. In smaller homogenous countries in Europe, where people''s primary identification may be ideological or political rather than geographical, and where political parties are internally
democratic, proportional representation may be an effective mechanism through which citizens can express their will. But in developing democracies political parties are seldom internally democratic, and people''s primary affiliation tends
to be to a region or regionally-based ethnic group rather than an ideology, so the proportional system may not provide the average citizen with effective representation.

In a proportion system a representative owes his or her first allegiance to the political party because the party – not the voter – decides who will be elected by determining which candidates will be placed on the list and their rank on the list. Individual representatives cannot form cross-party alliances to better serve their constituents: they must follow the party line because the voter elected the party, not the individual. Consequently, all power in a party is concentrated in the leadership. If a party is internally democratic this may not matter, as constituents can express their desires and aspirations through the party structure. Unfortunately, most of the parties in transitional democracies are formed from pre-existing groups that were powerful in the previous regime, and are seldom internally democratic, meaning that ordinary citizens have few channels through which to voice their concerns and aspirations.

Because the candidates do not represent a particular area, a party will often select all of the candidates from a particular class, group or region. Many of the candidates for remote provinces in the recent elections in Indonesia
actually lived in the capital, and had little or no connection to the place they hoped to represent. In Cambodia very few voters had ever seen or could even name any of their elected representatives. [2] In East Timor, voters felt that the parties had been captured by elites that had little connection to the people, and that they did not accurately reflect the people''s aspirations [3].

Although the proportional system is popular with some self-styled "election experts", when ordinary citizens in developing democracies are asked if they would prefer to vote for a party or an individual, they invariably and
overwhelmingly prefer to vote for the individual, as they feel that someone from their area, someone they might know or could approach, will better represent their interests. When presented with these concerns the experts often suggest
that the structure can be changed to a plurality system at some point in the future, when the country is stable, but this is almost impossible to achieve as the people who would have to approve the change would be the people elected
through the proportional system. If the political pressure from the people becomes too great, and they risk losing all, the experts might fall back and bargain for a mixed system – part proportional and part plurality – providing voters
with some of what they want.

The introduction of proportional representation may be particularly inappropriate in Afghanistan, where one of the primary objectives of the transition is to weaken the power of the informal militia leaders. In a proportional system each
militia band will form a party, and if that party were to win fifty seats in the National Assembly, the militia leader will retain control of all of them. In contrast, in an SNTV system the same party might again win fifty seats, but
each representative would be an independent operator directly accountable to his or her constituents – rather than the party leader – and able to form cross party alliances in their interest. The militia leader, instead of directly controlling
fifty seats, would control just one.

Proportional representation in developing democracies also often leads to political stagnation or the development of a de facto one party state. Although a system designed to provide representation to small parties and minorities, in practice one party may win an unchallengeable parliamentary majority, or form a ruling coalition. Individual representatives and small parties are unable to form cross-party alliances to more effectively represent their constituents. In other words, they may be present in parliament, but they have no avenue to exercise power,
all power is exercised by the leadership of the ruling party or coalition. Examples of de facto one party states engendered by the proportional system are Cambodia and South Africa, among others.

Because it empowers non-democratic political parties, proportional representation can impede the development of truly democratic parties. Although some have said '' political parties are vital for the creation of successful parliamentary democracies'' [4] this is questionable, as neither the US Congress nor the UK Parliament began with parties. In both cases political parties grew organically out of political factions that were formed by representatives whose constituents shared common aspirations and concerns. These were democratically legitimate parties from the beginning. On the other hand, most parties in transitional democracies are formed from pre-existing power groups, and if they are to become democratic and representative it will only be through a long process of reform.

Because representatives elected through the SNTV are accountable to their constituents rather than the party leadership, they are more independent, and can be advocates for the interests of their constituents within the party. Through this process the existing parties become more internally democratic, and more accurately reflect the concerns of the people. Independent representatives can also form cross-party alliances to advance particular issues. For example, representatives from farming areas might band together to influence agricultural policy. On occasion these temporary alliances might lead to the formation of more permanent factions and democratically legitimate parties, but in any case the interests of voters would be better represented.

Another criticism of SNTV is that it may not translate party votes into seats, but it is important to remember that parties are not running, individuals are, and the most popular individuals in a district – those who get the most votes
– will be elected through this system. Its true that SNTV will weaken the power of the parties in Afghanistan, but if the parties are not democratic, are in fact informal militia groups in sheep''s clothing, that may not be a bad thing.
To be successful in the SNTV parties will have to change, will have to appeal directly to voters, and will become more democratic and accountable. To maximize the number of seats they win parties will have to develop a grassroots organization, again enhancing their accountability and representativeness.

A final criticism of SNTV is that it is simply too difficult to administer. It is more complex than PR, but surely not impossible (Indonesian election officials recently conducted a much more complex election with far less international
support). And the advantages of the SNTV far outweigh its disadvantages. It will provide more effective representation and democratic accountability, help build democratic political parties and a vibrant political culture, and weaken
the power of informal militia groups.